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Abstract: In the last few decades, sustainability performance measuring has become a widely-studied
issue, and various measurement proposals have been put forward. However, it is also important to
know whether those measures are actually being used in the real world. In this case, we take one
very important indicator used by investors when they make investment decisions: the credit rating
of the potential investment. We test whether credit ratings take into account the above-mentioned
measures. Following the literature, we conduct a fixed-effects ordered probit analysis, using as
controls the variables usually found in the related literature on credit rating analysis. The dependent
variables are S&P ratings. We find that companies with higher sustainability performance tend to
have higher credit ratings, though having a less consistent performance over time seems to have no
effect. To check the robustness of our results, we also perform the analysis for different sectors and
sub-periods. In addition, we conduct the analysis using sustainability scores provided by ASSET4
(Datastream) as an explanatory variable and using Fitch credit ratings as the explained variable.
Keywords: sustainability performance; sustainability commitment; credit ratings; ESG criteria
1. Introduction
Since the publication of the Brundtland Commission’s definition of Sustainable Development
(SD), which states that ‘sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ [1], concerns about
it have increased. If society as a whole wants to achieve SD, different measures have to be taken to
redirect our world towards a sustainable path. This is why the Sustainable Development Goals [2] were
drawn up. From them, disciplines such as education for sustainable development [3] and Corporate
Social Responsibility (CSR) have grown, on the one hand to educate future citizens on the importance
of SD and on the other to get companies also to contribute to a sustainable future. In fact, as [4] stated,
there have been ‘increased demands of external stakeholders that hold companies accountable for
social and environmental issues’. Related with CSR, other concepts such as ‘corporate citizenship,
sustainability, triple bottom line and social performance’ have often been used as synonyms [5].
In this study, we use the concept of sustainability in relation to the above-mentioned definition of SD,
which takes into account economic, environmental and social issues.
Different performance measures have been proposed to assess whether companies carry out
their activities sustainably, as [6] reviewed in their paper. Two of the most novel measures are the
Relative Sustainable Performance Measure (RSPM) and the Measure of Commitment-failure (MC)
by [7]. The latter is, to the best of our knowledge, the first measure of commitment, and we think
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it is very important to consider this dimension of sustainability, because in order to really pursue
SD, one has to be committed to it. Both measures can easily be calculated with public data about
quantitative Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) variables, thus being, in our opinion,
more reliable than measures calculated with qualitative variables. They are also highly flexible.
For example, if one is concerned about CO2 emissions, one can build up a measure that takes into
account only that issue (along with company earnings), but if one wants an environmental, social or
overall measure, one can also be calculated by following the above-mentioned proposal. This is a big
advantage compared to other measures such as KLD scores, which, due to their agglutinative nature,
make it difficult to identify firms that pursue value-destroying CSR practices [8].
In the last few decades, increasing numbers of scholars have examined the relationship between
Corporate Social Performance (CSP) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) or firm value.
They have found mixed results. For example, some authors such as [9] (in some sectors) and [10–19]
concluded that there was a positive relationship between CSP and CFP, while [20] stated that there
was no direct relationship, but that the link was mediated by intangibles. The work in [21,22] (in the
banking sector) found a neutral relationship between the two performances. In contrast, [23] concluded
that the CSP-CFP relationship was negative, and [5] found the same effect of CSR in the bond market.
These mixed results may be caused by the treatment of CSP as an overall score, as [24] suggested.
The work in [25] added evidence on the link between the two constructs being weaker when ownership
is more concentrated. The work in [26] also found a moderating effect of ownership structure and
corporate reputation. More recently, [4] four that CSP affects Total Factor Productivity (TFP) positively
and that ‘TFP mediates the CSP-CFP relationship’. The work in [27] also concluded that even the
disclosure of ESG information increases firm value.
Other authors such as [28,29] have found that better corporate governance and ethics/CSR
decrease the cost of capital. Similarly, [30] found that higher corporate environmental performance also
reduces the cost of capital. The work in [31,32] stated that the cost of equity is lower for sustainably
responsible firms, and [33] found that there is an optimal level of CSR, beyond which debt financing
costs increase. In line with this last paper, [34] found a U-shaped relationship between CSR and
shareholder value.
In a related line of literature, it has been found that announcements on good CSR have no
significant effect on shareholder wealth [35], but that illegal behavior reduces financial performance [36]
and that the disclosure of environmental violations sparks less reaction in China than elsewhere [37].
The work in [38–40] stated that positive CSR reduces the risk of companies, but [41] concluded
that CSR strengths and concerns both increase company risk. The work in [8] found that ESG risks are
not valued in stock markets, which leads to negative surprises when ESG incidents occur.
Other researchers have analyzed whether credit rating agencies take ESG issues into account
when determining credit ratings, e.g., [42] in their conceptual model. Similarly, [43,44] created ethical
ratings/sustainability credit scores for banks.
According to [45], a credit rating is an ‘opinion of the general creditworthiness of a particular
issuer [. . . ] based on relevant risk factors’. Thus, credit ratings enable investors to make use of the
expertise of rating agencies [46]. As [47] stated, the credit rating industry impacts very strongly on the
financial markets and governments of the world. The work in [48] also highlights its power. Standard
& Poor’s, as stated in [45], analyzed both the financial and the business risk profiles of companies,
which, according to [49], include CSR-related issues. They also took governance and other factors
into account as modifiers of their ratings. The work in [50] described the rating process, including the
information used to determine ratings: information related to the company and information related
to the market in which it operates, which could also include CSR information. However, none of
those documents issued by the rating agencies stated clearly that they took into account sustainability
issues when determining the credit ratings of the companies (neither measured as qualitative, nor
quantitative variables). Therefore, it becomes an empirical issue.
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The work in [51,52] found that good governance is a positive driver of credit ratings, and [53]
stated that ‘trust underlies the corporate social responsibility (CSR) effects on long-term credit rating’.
In line with the concerns of these scholars, we believe that it is important to learn whether sustainability
measures are taken into account when these ratings are established, i.e., whether the credit rating
agencies are valuing sustainable behavior by companies as a factor to increase their creditworthiness,
thus reducing their debt risk premiums [5]. In the case of corporate bond markets, [5] found that
the effect of being socially responsible is non-significant or just the opposite of what was expected.
However, [49,54] found that rating agencies do indeed ‘collect and process CSR-related information in
assessing the companies’ creditworthiness’, so companies that get a better CSR score are more likely to
have a better rating. The work in [53] stated that ‘CSR has a positive effect on long-term credit rating
and such effect varies with country- and firm-level trust’.
In our paper, we extend these earlier studies by using the measures introduced by [7] as the
sustainability measures, due to their flexibility, their completeness and the fact that they are calculated
based on both financial and environmental and/or social quantitative variables.
To the best of our knowledge, the sustainability performance of companies has traditionally
been measured in terms of scores (usually combinations of binary variables). We propose to use a
more quantitative and reliable magnitude such as RSPM when analyzing whether the sustainability
performance of companies affects their credit ratings.
Additionally, there have been no analyses of the drivers of credit ratings, which have included
a commitment measure. In our opinion, investors concerned with sustainability would appreciate
the consideration of the degree of commitment towards those issues in the credit ratings. Therefore,
we analyze if it has indeed been taken into account by rating agencies.
Thus, the aim of this paper is to assess whether a good sustainability performance increases the
creditworthiness of companies and whether not being committed to sustainability issues decreases
the ratings.
We estimate fixed-effects ordered probit models with Standard & Poor’s (S&P) credit ratings as
the dependent variable and RSPM or MC as explanatory variables in order to measure the statistical
effect of those sustainability measures on credit ratings.
Our analysis yields several key findings. First, quantitative sustainability performance measures
such as RSPM have been taken into account to a lesser extent than more traditional ESG scores. Second,
commitment (failure) measures such as MC have not been taken into account at all in establishing
credit ratings.
The next section presents the data used in our estimations, including how the sample was selected.
In Section 3, we discuss our results, and Section 4 presents our conclusions.
2. Data
Here, we present the data used in this paper and their sources. We also include and briefly analyze
the descriptive statistics for each item.
It is important to note that, once all the variables were obtained and computed, we had an
unbalanced panel of 7365 observations representing 1008 companies from all over the world for
2008–2014 plus two additional years for credit ratings and control variables (2015 and 2016) to enable
us to estimate models with lags of sustainability performance and commitment measures.
2.1. Sustainability Performance Measures
First, we describe how RSPM and MC are calculated. The following definitions and formulas are
taken from [7]:
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• RSPM is a measure that ‘shows how well a company performs in environmental and social
matters’. It is calculated using the following formula:
RSPMCi,t =





where RSPMCi,t is the Relative Sustainable Performance Measure of the resource i of company C
in year t, Pro f itCt is the total returns of company C in year t measured as its EBIT in thousands
of USD, RUCi,t is the Use of Resource i by company C, measured in the units required in each











is the efficiency of use of resource i by sector S in year
t, with N being the total number of companies, and TACt is the total assets of company C in
year t in thousands of USD. We take the 10 Economic Sectors from Thomson Reuters Business
Classification (TRBC).
• MC is a measure that ’detects which companies have decreased their interest in those matters’.
Since we are looking for MC time series, we calculate it for two-year periods using the
following formula:
MCCi =
∣∣∣ACi,t ∗ Z(ACi,t)∣∣∣ (2)






i,t) is a function, which is one if A
C
i,t < 0 and zero if
ACi,t ≥ 0.
The RSPMs for different resources can be grouped into RSPMs of resource combinations by
calculating the arithmetic average of the former. Consequently, the MCs for those combinations can
also be calculated.
In order to calculate both of these figures, we obtained yearly ESG data on the use of 45 resources
from Datastream ASSET4 by Thomson Reuters (https://uvalibraryfeb.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/
asset4_esg_data_glossary_april2013.xlsx), and on Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) and total
assets (TA) from the Datastream Worldscope database for 2002–2015.
We followed the procedure presented in [7] and calculated the Representativityof each resource
in each sector taking into account the amount of total assetsrepresented in the sample. We selected the
resources that had, for most sectors, a Representativity in excess of 40% for more than one year and the
years in which the representativity levels for all those resources in all sectors was greater than 30%.
In line with these criteria, the period selected is 2008–2014, and the resources considered are carbon
dioxide equivalent emissions (CO2), Total Waste (WasteT), total Energy Use (EnU), Water Use (WaterU)
and total Donations (Don).
We computed the RSPM and the MC for these resources (RSPMCO2 and MCCO2, RSPMWasteT
and MCWasteT, RSPMEnU and MCEnU, RSPMWaterU and MCWaterU, and RSPMDon—the
only RSPM for which we changed the sign—and MCDon) and years, for the (equally weighted)
combinations of all the resources (RSPMcomb1 and MCcomb1) and for environmental resources only,
i.e., all except total donations (RSPMcomb2 and MCcomb2).
Since RSPM and, therefore, MC are calculated for the companies in each sector, we standardized
















are, respectively, the maximum and minimum of the MCs of resource i for all the companies in sector
S in year t.
We chose to make the two variables comparable in different ways because of their natures. RSPM
is not bounded on either side; however, MC is bounded on the left side, and it is very important to
maintain the zero values, because they have the special meaning of a company whose sustainability
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performance has not worsened over time. We therefore chose the classical approach of standardizing
the RSPM, but not the MC, and decided to rescale the latter in a way that maintained the zero values
as they were.
Finally, some outlier observations were eliminated from the dataset using the following heuristics
presented in [55], based on the boxplot function presented in [56]:
LowerLimit = Q1 − k ∗ (Q3 − Q1) (3)
and:
UpperLimit = Q3 − k ∗ (Q3 − Q1) (4)
where Qs is the s-th quartile and k a scalar (usually 1.5). In our case, we adjusted k to eliminate the
observations that were causing problems in the estimations.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the various RSPMs calculated and standardized year
by year. The mean in all cases is close to zero, and the standard deviation is practically one. The reason
why the mean is not zero and the standard deviation is not one is that, for the RSPMs to be more
realistic, the standardization was performed taking into account all the RSPMs in the sample even
if some of the values were not going to be included in the estimations (and in the description of
the variable) because they were from incomplete observations. In all cases (except for RSPMDon,
which always behaves oppositely to the other RSPMs), the absolute value of the minimum is larger
than the maximum. Since the median is higher than the mean in all but one of the cases, this shows
that most of the values are on the positive side. This is reflected in the negative skewness coefficient.
Moreover, the distributions are all leptokurtic, which means that they are more peaked than a normal
distribution and have heavier tails.
It is also noteworthy that the median decreases over time, accompanied by a decrease in the
minimum, while the maximum stays around similar levels. This shows that, as a whole, those
companies that were performing worst have worsened their performance, while those companies that
were performing best have remained at similar levels.
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between the different RSPMs. The correlations between
the four environmental RSPMs are moderate (between 0.26 and 0.67), showing that companies
that perform better for some environmental issues tend also to do well for other environmental
issues. Apart from that, both combinations are logically quite closely correlated with their elements,
with the correlations being higher than 0.41. The only exception is the correlation of RSPMcomb1
with RSPMDon, which is 0.28. This is because RSPMDon behaves differently from all the other
individual RSPMs, as can be seen in the negative correlations between RSPMDon and the four
environmental RSPMs.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the rescaled MCs. It can be seen that the mean is
closer to zero than to one in all cases and that the median is very close to zero or is actually zero in
many cases, which shows that more than half the companies have not worsened their sustainability
performance over time. All this is reflected in the positive skewness of the distributions, which are also
leptokurtic. Moreover, it is worth noting that the mean of the different MCs decreases from 2008–2014,
which shows that companies became more committed to environmental and social issues over the
period, in spite of the drop in the median of the RSPM.
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between the different MCs, revealing a pattern very
similar to that in Table 2. Some of the coefficients between the MCs of the combinations and
their elements are slightly lower and some slightly higher than the corresponding values for the
RSPMs, while the correlations between the individual environmental MCs are higher (showing
that companies that are more committed to some environmental issues are also committed to other
environmental issues).
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Table 1. Descriptions of the standardized RSPMs year by year.





Panel A: CO2 RSPM (RSPMCO2)
2008 (n = 441) −0.011 0.199 −7.960 2.235 0.976 88.014 −2.477 15.266
2009 (n = 523) −0.007 0.175 −9.044 3.755 0.945 127.317 −2.203 20.376
2010 (n = 573) −0.001 0.180 −9.183 3.954 0.966 882.213 −2.556 20.312
2011 (n = 640) −0.012 0.158 −10.599 2.708 0.996 81.339 −3.639 28.886
2012 (n = 677) −0.029 0.160 −10.059 2.846 1.014 34.602 −2.973 21.501
2013 (n = 670) 0.005 0.130 −10.814 2.765 0.976 181.291 −3.805 31.779
2014 (n = 676) 0.009 0.106 −10.827 2.876 0.969 109.540 −3.816 33.563
Panel B: Waste Total RSPM (RSPMWasteT)
2008 (n = 302) 0.025 0.159 −6.781 2.289 0.958 38.398 −2.841 15.716
2009 (n = 335) 0.031 0.140 −4.786 2.744 0.903 28.693 −1.290 7.980
2010 (n = 380) 0.012 0.137 −7.943 2.318 0.984 79.981 −2.958 18.636
2011 (n = 418) 0.017 0.129 −8.703 2.485 0.991 58.234 −3.556 24.026
2012 (n = 443) 0.033 0.123 −8.928 2.300 0.923 28.204 −3.527 27.769
2013 (n = 470) 0.029 0.144 −8.083 3.904 0.937 32.793 −3.361 24.281
2014 (n = 501) 0.027 0.106 −9.899 3.756 0.911 33.261 −3.386 33.522
Panel C: Energy Use Total RSPM (RSPMEnU)
2008 (n = 374) −0.027 0.148 −8.493 1.853 0.986 36.682 −3.229 21.429
2009 (n = 423) 0.000 0.205 −7.853 2.738 0.967 5736.542 −2.974 20.633
2010 (n = 487) −0.021 0.145 −8.922 3.047 1.010 48.189 −3.852 26.890
2011 (n = 522) −0.029 0.145 −9.549 2.372 1.037 35.395 −4.152 28.121
2012 (n = 562) −0.016 0.141 −10.167 3.691 1.036 63.627 −4.867 37.436
2013 (n = 602) −0.017 0.137 −10.040 3.719 1.041 61.577 −4.088 31.099
2014 (n = 606) −0.013 0.141 −10.485 3.696 1.031 79.743 −4.786 36.161
Panel D: Water Use RSPM (RSPMWaterU)
2008 (n = 356) −0.027 0.270 −5.353 2.014 0.984 36.353 −2.389 10.779
2009 (n = 396) 0.005 0.202 −7.678 2.530 0.894 172.811 −2.849 20.041
2010 (n = 447) −0.016 0.120 −10.029 3.808 0.998 60.785 −5.793 50.875
2011 (n = 482) −0.016 0.149 −9.325 3.755 0.992 62.758 −3.757 30.710
2012 (n = 520) −0.007 0.113 −10.277 2.879 0.989 139.131 −4.159 37.165
2013 (n = 555) −0.011 0.137 −10.566 2.283 1.034 90.722 −4.631 36.145
2014 (n = 577) 0.008 0.121 −10.340 2.794 1.000 117.749 −3.127 28.034
Panel E: Donations Total RSPM (RSPMDon)
2008 (n = 360) 0.034 −0.218 −2.003 6.322 0.997 29.576 2.769 14.050
2009 (n = 402) 0.007 −0.103 −2.363 6.087 0.845 117.386 2.035 13.207
2010 (n = 449) 0.058 −0.143 −2.546 9.266 1.069 18.545 4.195 26.214
2011 (n = 479) 0.051 −0.115 −2.835 9.853 1.028 20.186 4.460 32.722
2012 (n = 535) 0.052 −0.117 −2.884 10.063 1.008 19.227 4.351 34.843
2013 (n = 580) 0.039 −0.126 −2.900 11.151 1.003 26.031 5.806 52.793
2014 (n = 589) 0.016 −0.130 −3.549 9.473 0.997 61.315 3.762 30.291
Panel F: RSPM of the combination of all resources (RSPMcomb1)
2008 (n = 544) −0.002 0.148 −7.796 6.657 1.036 511.456 −2.492 24.241
2009 (n = 610) 0.009 0.121 −7.755 3.816 0.908 96.494 −1.798 17.642
2010 (n = 669) 0.007 0.098 −13.035 7.669 1.057 152.527 −5.024 64.402
2011 (n = 718) −0.011 0.096 −13.533 6.088 1.061 98.911 −4.158 48.593
2012 (n = 779) −0.005 0.095 −14.305 10.281 1.024 210.071 −4.300 76.525
2013 (n = 807) 0.000 0.100 −14.554 8.615 1.018 2710.369 −5.191 74.259
2014 (n = 826) 0.012 0.093 −14.425 10.156 0.998 86.350 −4.033 78.975
Panel G: RSPM of the combination of only environmental resources (RSPMcomb2)
2008 (n = 480) −0.012 0.184 −7.195 2.464 1.002 82.539 −2.904 18.106
2009 (n = 556) 0.015 0.158 −6.961 3.119 0.911 59.730 −2.043 16.172
2010 (n = 618) −0.003 0.120 −11.388 3.857 1.018 371.750 −5.844 57.352
2011 (n = 676) −0.015 0.112 −12.124 2.814 1.038 71.576 −4.167 38.372
2012 (n = 723) −0.008 0.111 −12.694 2.856 1.029 129.181 −4.992 47.700
2013 (n = 729) 0.000 0.127 −12.670 2.812 1.023 40539.154 −5.380 49.778
2014 (n = 738) 0.010 0.109 −12.530 3.003 0.988 95.818 −5.581 54.883
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the environmental and social standardized RSPMs used
in this study, for 2008–2014.
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Table 2. RSPM correlation matrix.
RSPMcomb1 RSPMcomb2 RSPMCO2 RSPMWasteT RSPMEnU RSPMWaterU RSPMDon
RSPMcomb1 1
RSPMcomb2 0.835 *** 1
RSPMCO2 0.428 *** 0.540 *** 1
RSPMWasteT 0.652 *** 0.754 *** 0.473 *** 1
RSPMEnU 0.491 *** 0.694 *** 0.569 *** 0.263 *** 1
RSPMWaterU 0.413 *** 0.563 *** 0.664 *** 0.521 *** 0.398 *** 1
RSPMDon 0.280 *** −0.175 *** −0.125 ** −0.146 ** −0.242 *** −0.208 *** 1
This table shows the correlation coefficients between all the various RSPMs. ** and *** denote that the
coefficients are significantly different from zero at 1% and 0.1%, respectively.
Moreover, to enable us to compute robustness checks, we also obtained data on different
grouped ESG scores given by Thomson Reuters ASSET4 (henceforth ASSET4) to the companies
selected (Environmental (EnvScoreA4), Social (SocScoreA4) and ESG ratings, which we call “scores”
(TotScoreA4)). We do not take the corporate governance score into account, as we do not have any
quantitative values for resources of that type. These scores have been traditionally used to measure
the sustainability performance of companies both by professionals and scholars. The data are for
2008–2015 (one year more than we were reliably able to calculate for RSPMs and MCs). We have not
rescaled them in any way because they are comparable across sectors as [57] states. According to that
publication, the total rating or score is calculated by ASSET4 as the equally-weighted average of the
environmental, social and governance ratings or scores, which, in turn have been calculated using
so-called raw scores. Those raw scores are computed from the different data points applying different
values or calculations depending on the nature of the data point (Boolean ‘yes/no’ or quantitative),
weighting them with the ‘Relative Level of Importance’ (defined in the document), and afterwards
fitted to a bell curve. Thus, the scores rank the different companies and have most of the values around
50 and very small values close to zero and to 100. The whole calculation process is described in
depth in [57].
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the above-mentioned scores. The mean and median
values are not very far apart and are both closer to the maximum (close to 100%) than to the minimum
(around 5–10%), and the median is always higher than the mean. This leads to the distributions being
slightly negatively skewed, with the left tail of the distribution being longer and with more than
half of the observation values being higher than 50%. It is also worth mentioning that the mean and
median increase over time, contrary to what happens with the medians of the RSPMs, which is quite
interesting. The fact that calculations for RSPMs also include financial information makes the two
measures different.
Table 6 shows that all three scores are closely correlated. It is particularly noteworthy that
the environmental and social scores are closely correlated, showing that most companies that are
performing well environmentally are also performing well socially according to ASSET4 scores.
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Table 3. Descriptions of the rescaled MCs year by year.





Panel A: CO2 MC (MCCO2)
2008 (n = 377) 0.086 0.001 0 1 0.198 2.287 3.283 13.904
2009 (n = 438) 0.105 0.005 0 1 0.201 1.920 2.735 10.711
2010 (n = 512) 0.081 0 0 1 0.193 2.391 3.035 11.872
2011 (n = 585) 0.078 0.000 0 1 0.177 2.261 3.525 16.389
2012 (n = 646) 0.076 0 0 1 0.175 2.320 3.333 15.137
2013 (n = 636) 0.080 0 0 1 0.176 2.200 3.335 15.143
2014 (n = 655) 0.062 0 0 1 0.158 2.538 4.027 20.893
Panel B: Waste Total MC (MCWasteT)
2008 (n = 251) 0.120 0 0 1 0.238 1.979 2.587 9.134
2009 (n = 290) 0.149 0.033 0 1 0.236 1.584 2.030 6.754
2010 (n = 331) 0.081 0 0 1 0.217 2.670 3.344 13.342
2011 (n = 377) 0.093 0.000 0 1 0.207 2.236 3.002 11.896
2012 (n = 415) 0.138 0.009 0 1 0.242 1.757 2.167 7.024
2013 (n = 437) 0.093 0 0 1 0.192 2.077 3.058 13.087
2014 (n = 464) 0.082 0 0 1 0.183 2.225 3.109 13.294
Panel C: Energy Use Total MC (MCEnU)
2008 (n = 309) 0.081 0.002 0 1 0.196 2.406 3.488 15.461
2009 (n = 362) 0.108 0.001 0 1 0.204 1.889 2.588 9.919
2010 (n = 423) 0.078 0 0 1 0.188 2.398 3.142 13.311
2011 (n = 484) 0.079 0.002 0 1 0.197 2.497 3.531 15.267
2012 (n = 520) 0.074 0.001 0 1 0.192 2.579 3.608 16.039
2013 (n = 559) 0.054 0 0 1 0.149 2.763 4.524 26.094
2014 (n = 588) 0.078 0.001 0 1 0.181 2.316 3.250 14.168
Panel D: Water Use MC (MCWaterU)
2008 (n = 303) 0.100 0.006 0 1 0.207 2.067 3.014 12.290
2009 (n = 345) 0.111 0 0 1 0.208 1.875 2.498 9.302
2010 (n = 387) 0.066 0 0 1 0.188 2.839 3.914 18.172
2011 (n = 447) 0.075 0 0 1 0.183 2.459 3.413 15.120
2012 (n = 484) 0.110 0.001 0 1 0.217 1.975 2.527 9.060
2013 (n = 514) 0.083 0 0 1 0.183 2.214 3.155 13.613
2014 (n = 548) 0.080 0 0 1 0.183 2.296 3.181 13.706
Panel E: Donations Total MC (MCDon)
2008 (n = 270) 0.094 0 0 1 0.216 2.305 3.195 12.863
2009 (n = 352) 0.095 0.008 0 1 0.199 2.097 3.050 12.474
2010 (n = 379) 0.091 0 0 1 0.200 2.185 3.080 12.677
2011 (n = 436) 0.077 0 0 1 0.195 2.540 3.400 14.628
2012 (n = 469) 0.094 0 0 1 0.203 2.166 2.791 10.570
2013 (n = 521) 0.050 0.003 0 1 0.148 2.932 5.145 31.439
2014 (n = 558) 0.068 0 0 1 0.178 2.615 3.805 18.027
Panel F: MC of the combination of all resources (MCcomb1)
2008 (n = 459) 0.072 0 0 1 0.193 2.663 3.531 15.504
2009 (n = 540) 0.081 0.001 0 1 0.181 2.228 3.301 14.712
2010 (n = 603) 0.039 0 0 1 0.148 3.768 5.031 29.160
2011 (n = 681) 0.063 0 0 1 0.155 2.475 3.731 18.690
2012 (n = 741) 0.041 0 0 1 0.125 3.071 5.320 35.826
2013 (n = 775) 0.041 0 0 1 0.128 3.156 5.602 38.536
2014 (n = 812) 0.043 0 0 1 0.138 3.183 5.220 32.945
Panel G: MC of the combination of only environmental resources (MCcomb2)
2008 (n = 413) 0.087 0.000 0 1 0.196 2.265 3.223 13.597
2009 (n = 476) 0.094 0 0 1 0.194 2.060 2.844 11.518
2010 (n = 551) 0.045 0 0 1 0.162 3.558 4.655 24.804
2011 (n = 629) 0.069 0 0 1 0.168 2.423 3.614 17.196
2012 (n = 690) 0.063 0 0 1 0.166 2.646 3.925 19.591
2013 (n = 696) 0.054 0 0 1 0.152 2.817 4.491 25.415
2014 (n = 722) 0.049 0 0 1 0.145 2.966 4.799 28.765
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the environmental and social rescaled MCs used in this
study, for 2008–2014.
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Table 4. MC correlation matrix.
MCcomb1 MCcomb2 MCCO2 MCWasteT MCEnU MCWaterU MCDon
MCcomb1 1
MCcomb2 0.930 *** 1
MCCO2 0.589 *** 0.657 *** 1
MCWasteT 0.532 *** 0.555 *** 0.664 *** 1
MCEnU 0.668 *** 0.734 *** 0.662 *** 0.604 *** 1
MCWaterU 0.608 *** 0.667 *** 0.659 *** 0.643 *** 0.699 *** 1
MCDon 0.102 * −0.108 * −0.125 ** −0.169 ** −0.125 * −0.109 * 1
This table shows the correlation coefficients between all the various MCs. *, ** and *** denote that the
coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively.
Table 5. Descriptions of the ASSET4 scores year by year.





Panel A: Environmental Score (EnvScoreA4)
2008 (n = 151) 67.186 81.170 9.820 94.100 29.018 0.432 −0.872 2.232
2009 (n = 158) 67.489 80.380 10.090 94.410 28.698 0.425 −0.842 2.201
2010 (n = 163) 69.486 83.520 9.240 94.960 27.305 0.393 −0.962 2.490
2011 (n = 169) 70.438 82.090 9.130 94.650 25.619 0.364 −1.013 2.688
2012 (n = 178) 70.237 81.130 8.580 94.260 24.695 0.352 −0.987 2.722
2013 (n = 183) 71.073 81.300 8.740 94.360 24.393 0.343 −1.027 2.812
2014 (n = 189) 72.508 82.260 9.380 94.620 22.493 0.310 −1.036 2.969
2015 (n = 191) 77.987 86.360 12.690 95.050 19.767 0.253 −1.433 4.233
Panel B: Social Score (SocScoreA4)
2008 (n = 172) 69.263 77.965 3.930 97.810 26.675 0.385 −0.972 2.793
2009 (n = 183) 70.116 82.700 6.770 97.630 27.443 0.391 −0.926 2.550
2010 (n = 187) 71.512 82.650 6.330 97.420 26.083 0.365 −1.022 2.791
2011 (n = 195) 70.925 80.700 4.730 97.220 25.573 0.361 −1.007 2.812
2012 (n = 204) 70.041 81.610 4.920 96.960 26.245 0.375 −0.948 2.615
2013 (n = 212) 70.698 82.540 4.940 96.890 25.841 0.366 −0.987 2.770
2014 (n = 220) 71.359 82.750 5.000 96.780 24.685 0.346 −1.032 2.906
2015 (n = 221) 77.332 86.570 9.040 96.290 20.352 0.263 −1.400 4.063
Panel C: Total Score (TotScoreA4)
2008 (n = 167) 72.292 85.780 5.030 97.400 25.988 0.359 −1.000 2.757
2009 (n = 177) 72.132 83.790 5.150 97.440 26.949 0.374 −0.973 2.614
2010 (n = 181) 74.079 86.190 5.220 96.620 25.551 0.345 −1.170 3.120
2011 (n = 189) 73.649 85.510 4.410 96.420 25.312 0.344 −1.208 3.319
2012 (n = 198) 73.197 85.390 3.400 96.750 25.599 0.350 −1.136 3.075
2013 (n = 203) 74.028 85.030 4.700 96.680 24.986 0.338 −1.255 3.490
2014 (n = 210) 74.911 82.520 5.340 96.810 22.347 0.298 −1.318 3.982
2015 (n = 212) 80.288 86.600 11.160 96.070 17.757 0.221 −1.816 6.000
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the scores (environmental, social and total) given by
ASSET4 used in this study, for 2008–2015.
Table 6. ASSET4 score correlation matrix.
TotScoreA4 EnvScoreA4 SocScoreA4
TotScoreA4 1
EnvScoreA4 0.837 *** 1
SocScoreA4 0.813 *** 0.738 *** 1
This table shows the correlation coefficients between all the different scores given by ASSET4.
*** denotes that the coefficients are significantly different from zero at 0.1%.
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2.2. Credit Ratings
We obtained the S&P long-term issuer credit ratings of the companies for 2008–2016 from
Bloomberg. The rating methodology for S&P is set out in [45]. Following the relevant literature
([49,52,58], among others), we transformed the credit ratings into an ordinal scale, and we assigned
the following values:
• AAA+, AAA and AAA−: 9
• AA+, AA and AA−: 8
• A+, A and A−: 7
• BBB+, BBB and BBB−: 6
• BB+, BB and BB−: 5
• B+, B and B−: 4
• CCC+, CCC and CCC−: 3
• CC+, CC and CC−: 2
• DDD, DD and D: 1
Table 7 shows the number of S&P issuer ratings year by year. Most of the ratings are between
BB− and A+, CC being the one with the least values. Moreover, probably due to the effects of the
financial crisis, AA and AAA ratings decreased over the period analyzed.
Table 7. Standard & Poor’s ratings year by year.
Year S&P Ratings Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2008 1 0 0 18 121 340 243 85 6 814
2009 0 0 1 25 122 335 242 64 4 793
2010 0 0 0 27 125 346 251 57 4 810
2011 0 1 2 32 124 387 255 54 5 860
2012 1 1 3 33 126 419 247 47 5 882
2013 0 0 6 34 131 432 245 50 5 903
2014 0 0 5 44 143 423 264 51 5 935
2015 3 0 7 43 149 428 253 54 5 942
2016 1 1 13 46 153 418 244 54 3 933
Total 6 3 37 302 1194 3528 2244 516 42 7872
This table shows the number of Standard & Poor’s issuer ratings year by year for 2008–2016. Ratings
are converted to an ordinal scale: 9 (AAA+, AAA and AAA−), 8 (AA+, AA and AA−), 7 (A+, A and
A−), 6 (BBB+, BBB and BBB−), 5 (BB+, BB and BB−), 4 (B+, B and B−), 3 (CCC+, CCC and CCC−),
2 (CC+, CC and CC−) and 1 (DDD, DD and D).
Additionally, to conduct robustness checks, we also obtained data on Fitch issuer credit ratings
for the same period from the Datastream ASSET4 database. The rating methodology can be found
in [50]. The correlation between S&P and Fitch ratings is 0.825, which shows that the ratings given by
the two companies are very similar.
Table 8 shows the number of Fitch issuer ratings per year. The distribution is very similar to that
for S&P, but the sample is considerably smaller.
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Table 8. Fitch ratings year by year.
Year Fitch Ratings Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2008 1 0 1 9 48 165 161 81 4 470
2009 1 0 1 11 62 183 174 66 4 502
2010 1 0 1 14 70 210 180 62 4 542
2011 1 1 1 16 73 239 188 49 3 571
2012 2 1 2 16 78 266 179 45 2 591
2013 3 0 1 18 85 268 176 46 2 599
2014 3 0 1 18 82 270 175 43 2 594
2015 3 0 1 17 81 268 172 43 2 587
2016 3 0 1 15 64 242 155 40 2 522
Total 18 2 10 134 643 2111 1560 475 25 4978
This table shows the number of Fitch issuer ratings year by year for 2008–2016. Ratings are converted
to an ordinal scale: 9 (AAA+, AAA and AAA−), 8 (AA+, AA and AA−), 7 (A+, A and A−), 6 (BBB+,
BBB and BBB−), 5 (BB+, BB and BB−), 4 (B+, B and B−), 3 (CCC+, CCC and CCC−), 2 (CC+, CC and
CC−) and 1 (DDD, DD and D).
2.3. Control Variables
We control for a group of variables traditionally used in the literature analyzing the drivers of
credit ratings ([49,52,58], among others), namely:
• CAPINT: ratio of property, plant and equipment (PPE) or Fixed Assets to TA
• COVERAGE: ratio of EBIT plus interest expense to interest expense
• LEVERAGE: ratio of long-term debt to TA
• LOSS: a variable that takes a value of one if the company had a negative net income before
extraordinary items in the current year and the previous one and zero if not
• MARGIN: ratio of operating income to sales
• SIZE: natural logarithm of TA. As [59] stated, SIZE is a fundamental variable when doing research
on empirical corporate finance, and as it can be measured in different ways, the selection of one
measure over others has to be justified. In our case, we use the natural logarithm of TA, because
it is less related to the market than market capitalizationand also to firm performance, because
that is what the sustainability measures already included in the estimations deal with, especially
RSPM. On top of that, the natural logarithm of TA is the most commonly-used SIZE measure in
the literature that analyzes the drivers of credit ratings.
• STD: Standard Deviation of the yearly returns on investment in the company, taking seven-year
moving windows
We obtained the yearly data needed to calculate the above-mentioned controls for 2008–2016 from
the Datastream Worldscope database.
Table 9 shows the descriptions of the control variables for the whole sample (including 2015 and
2016). The means of CAPINT and LEVERAGE are about 1/3 and 1/5, respectively, of the TA, showing
that the companies included in the sample have, on average, less fixed assets than current assets and
more short-term debt and equity than long-term debt. For COVERAGE and MARGIN, the means are
positive. However, in the case of COVERAGE, the mean is much closer to the minimum than to the
maximum, which makes the distribution highly positively skewed. For MARGIN, the opposite is true.
LOSS is an indicator variable, so its value is either zero or one. Since its mean is very close to zero,
most of the companies in the sample did not have negative net income before extraordinary items for
two years in a row in the period analyzed. Moreover, it can be deduced from the SIZE variable that
the average total assets of the companies in the sample is 24,079.03 millions of USD, going from 54.38
millions of USD to 4,766,630.16 millions of USD, thus covering a wide range of company sizes. Finally,
STD is quite small for all the companies and years, but there are some higher values as is the maximum.
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Table 9. Descriptions for the control variables.




CAPINT (n = 7365) 0.335 0.287 0 0.984 0.274 0.819 0.448 1.997
COVERAGE (n = 7365) 39.676 5.958 −1511.575 140,633.500 1646.577 41.500 84.577 7219.264
LEVERAGE (n = 7365) 0.224 0.209 0 0.870 0.142 0.633 0.644 3.233
LOSS (n = 7365) 0.051 0 0 1 0.220 4.306 4.073 17.590
MARGIN (n = 7365) 0.054 0.125 −188.687 10.483 3.368 62.165 −41.913 1958.038
SIZE (n = 7365) 16.997 16.852 10.904 22.285 1.481 0.087 0.591 3.412
STD (n = 7365) 0.379 0.313 0.042 4.953 0.281 0.742 4.191 41.617
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the control variables used in the model estimation for the
whole period 2008–2016.
Table 10 shows the correlation coefficients between the control variables and RSPMcomb2,
MCcomb2 and TotScoreA4. The correlations between the control variables are quite low, except
for CAPINT and LEVERAGE, which is 0.429. This helps avoid multicollinearity.
Table 10. Control variable correlation matrix.
RSPMcomb2 MCcomb2 TotScoreA4 CAPINT COVERAGE LEVERAGE LOSS MARGIN SIZE STD
RSPMcomb2 1
MCcomb2 −0.442 *** 1
TotScoreA4 0.100 0.0260 1
CAPINT −0.113 ** 0.0836 * −0.114 ** 1
COVERAGE 0.194 *** −0.161 *** 0.0346 −0.0229 1
LEVERAGE −0.0521 0.0408 −0.198 *** 0.429 *** −0.159 *** 1
LOSS −0.179 *** 0.00881 −0.167 *** 0.127 *** −0.0489 * 0.175 *** 1
MARGIN 0.0700 −0.109 ** 0.0902 * 0.0430 * 0.00787 0.0454 * −0.0254 1
SIZE 0.115 ** −0.148 *** 0.276 *** −0.290 *** 0.0117 −0.313 *** −0.116 *** 0.0449 * 1
STD −0.0794 * 0.0702 −0.249 *** −0.0182 −0.0444 * 0.0163 0.109 *** −0.0205 −0.186 *** 1
This table shows the correlation coefficients between all the control variables and one of the RSPMs
and one of the MCs used in the model estimation. *, ** and *** denote that the coefficients are
significantly different from zero at 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively.
Moreover, the correlation coefficients between RSPMcomb2 and TotScoreA4, and MCcomb2 and
TotScoreA4 are not significantly different from zero, which shows that RSPMcomb2 and MCcomb2
are not at all related to TotScoreA4. Once again, it can be seen that the use of novel measures, that
are not as known as the scores by ASSET4, such as RSPM and MC, can improve our knowledge
of the relationship between credit ratings and sustainability performance and commitment. In fact,
we think that the quantitative nature of the data used to calculate it makes RSPM a better proxy of
sustainability performance and that MC adds information that is essential to assess it: the commitment
of the companies towards sustainability.
Finally, the correlation between RSPMcomb2 and MCcomb2 is significantly negative, which shows
that companies that perform better in environmental and social issues are also more committed to them.
3. Results
This section presents the results of our estimation of fixed-effects ordered probit panel regressions,
clustering robust standard errors by company and including economic sector and year dummies.
We used an ordered probit model, because our dependent variable is categorical and ordered.
The models that we estimate in this section follow this equation:
RatingCt = βSM ∗ SMCt−k + βCV ∗ CV
C
t−1 + βS ∗ SectordummiesC + βY ∗ Yeardummiest + εCt (5)
where Rating is the credit rating, C identifies the companies, t is the number of observations in each
cluster (years), k is the number of lags, SM is the sustainability measure included in most of the
models (RSPMs, MCs or the scores from ASSET4), CV are the seven control variables presented above,
Sectordummies represents the nine dummies for the different sectors (excluding one used as reference),
Yeardummies are the dummies for the different years (excluding always one used as reference) and ε
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stands for errors. In order to avoid multicollinearity, we only include one sustainability measure in
each model estimated.
Note that, in order to mitigate a possible endogeneity problem and following [60], we have
included the remedies proposed in that paper that best suit our case:
• Lagged independent variables: to alleviate the simultaneity problem and to be able to claim
causality of the potentially found relationships between sustainability measures and credit ratings
• Firm and sector fixed effects: to ensure that time-invariant firm and sector characteristics are not
absorbed by the error term
• Year fixed effects: to capture the effect that economic conditions and other market shocks may
have on both credit ratings and sustainability performance
• Control variables: to ensure that time-variant firm characteristics are not captured by the error term
3.1. Main Models
We have estimated the model specified in Equation (5), where RSPM is the sustainability measure.
We included none or one of the RSPMs, either the one- or two-year lag. In principle, we found it more
logical to include the one-year lag, because, as we have realized, the values of the quantitative variables
used to calculate the RSPMs were usually available the next year. After analyzing the results of both
options, we concluded that the best method is to use the one-year lag in the estimations, because
the results were more sensible, and this is consistent with our initial thoughts, with the estimation
period thus being 2009–2015. Those results are included in Table 11. We use the adjusted McFadden’s
pseudo-R2 as the goodness of fit measure. It modifies McFadden’s pseudo-R2 presented in [61], taking
into account the number of covariates in each estimation. It is important to note that the unbalanced
nature of the data panel caused the number of observations to be different for each model, so to ensure
comparability, we included the adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2 for both the model estimated and the
model without RSPM for the different subsamples used in each case.
It can be seen that the results for the control variables were quite consistent with the prior literature:
for example, LEVERAGE, LOSS and STD had a negative relationship with credit ratings, as shown
by their significantly negative coefficients. The only difference is that the coefficient of the variable
MARGIN is significantly negative in more than one case. We found that all of the environmental
RSPMs have significantly positive coefficients, which shows that companies that perform better
environmentally tend to receive higher credit ratings. The coefficient of RSPMDon was not significant.
However, the coefficient being negative is interesting and led us to think that donationswere not
considered good in the credit rating industry, probably because they reduced net profit. RSPMcomb2,
the RSPM of the combination of all the environmental resources, was the only combination that had a
significant coefficient.
The adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2 was quite high (McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is usually much
lower than the traditional R2, and values of 0.2–0.4 ’represent an excellent fit’ [62]) in all of the models,
and as revealed by the significance of the coefficients, the pseudo-R2 of the estimations increased most
in relative terms with respect to the model with only the controls in the models with RSPMCO2 and
RSPMWaterU, especially in the former (6.41% vs. 4.26%).
Next, we estimated the same models for the different MCs. In this case, the best models were
those with the two-year lag. Therefore, the estimation period was 2010–2016. Since MC measures
commitment-failure over time, it should take longer to affect the determination of credit ratings.
Table 12 shows the results of the different estimations. The results for the control variables are
consistent with the prior literature. The coefficients for the MCs were negative in all cases, because the
MC became worse the higher it was. However, none had significant coefficients.
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CAPINTLag1 0.572 0.676 0.750 0.860 0.781 0.825 0.925 0.420
(3.71) ** (3.96) ** (4.10) ** (4.66) ** (3.67) ** (4.06) ** (4.28) ** (1.93)
COVERAGELag1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 −0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.37) (1.19) (1.86) (1.79) (1.59) (0.50) (2.84) ** (1.20)
LEVERAGELag1 −1.971 −2.285 −2.342 −2.312 −2.780 −2.468 −2.582 −2.312
(6.91) ** (7.43) ** (7.38) ** (6.89) ** (6.99) ** (7.33) ** (7.00) ** (6.45) **
LOSSLag1 −1.201 −1.158 −1.158 −1.072 −1.047 −1.138 −1.068 −0.835
(12.17) ** (9.63) ** (9.29) ** (8.19) ** (7.03) ** (8.47) ** (7.54) ** (5.07) **
MARGINLag1 −0.001 −0.003 −0.005 −0.007 −0.002 −0.005 −0.006 1.510
(0.29) (1.51) (2.32) * (3.63) ** (0.47) (2.99) ** (3.52) ** (3.33) **
SIZELag1 0.356 0.350 0.338 0.345 0.349 0.326 0.350 0.377
(13.79) ** (13.20) ** (12.40) ** (12.32) ** (10.18) ** (10.91) ** (10.88) ** (11.85) **
STDLag1 −1.445 −1.511 −1.458 −1.529 −1.651 −1.839 −1.695 −1.907
(8.94) ** (7.01) ** (6.18) ** (5.56) ** (7.09) ** (9.20) ** (8.39) ** (10.53) **
N 6006 4622 4228 3940 2657 3328 3129 3233
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1814 0.1830 0.1873 0.2005 0.1987 0.1891 0.1868 0.2059
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 of model without RSPM 0.1814 0.1817 0.1837 0.1884 0.1940 0.1862 0.1792 0.2045
This table shows the results of the fixed-effects ordered probit model estimation with the various RSPMs and all the controls for 2009–2015. In all models, industry
and year effects are taken into account with industry and year dummies (not included in the table). * and ** denote that the coefficients are significantly different
from zero at 5% and 1%, respectively.
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CAPINTLag1 0.572 0.569 0.610 0.639 0.293 0.733 0.852 0.445
(3.71) ** (3.36) ** (3.41) ** (3.41) ** (1.26) (3.66) ** (4.01) ** (2.01) *
COVERAGELag1 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.37) (1.80) (1.80) (1.77) (1.40) (1.77) (1.72) (1.61)
LEVERAGELag1 −1.971 −2.020 −2.074 −2.227 −2.972 −2.231 −2.304 −2.307
(6.91) ** (6.57) ** (6.46) ** (6.53) ** (7.46) ** (6.21) ** (6.28) ** (6.13) **
LOSSLag1 −1.201 −1.212 −1.208 −1.258 −0.874 −1.214 −1.111 −0.937
(12.17) ** (11.71) ** (11.16) ** (11.35) ** (6.46) ** (10.84) ** (9.58) ** (6.48) **
MARGINLag1 −0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 2.381 −0.002 −0.001 1.793
(0.29) (0.11) (0.19) (0.29) (6.30) ** (0.95) (0.83) (4.36) **
SIZELag1 0.356 0.338 0.324 0.323 0.335 0.317 0.331 0.368
(13.79) ** (12.47) ** (11.52) ** (11.01) ** (9.08) ** (9.87) ** (9.88) ** (11.22) **
STDLag1 −1.445 −1.747 −1.773 −1.858 −1.685 −2.028 −1.615 −1.799
(8.94) ** (10.97) ** (9.77) ** (9.59) ** (7.58) ** (11.31) ** (7.40) ** (9.13) **
N 6006 4430 3997 3683 2426 3077 2907 2939
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1814 0.1877 0.1881 0.1895 0.2085 0.1949 0.1767 0.2075
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 of model without MC 0.1814 0.1878 0.1883 0.1896 0.2088 0.1948 0.1769 0.2073
This table shows the results of the fixed-effects ordered probit model estimation with the various MCs and all the controls for the period 2010–2016. In all models,
industry and year effects are taken into account with industry and year dummies (not included in the table). * and ** denote that the coefficients are significantly
different from zero at 5% and 1%, respectively.
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As for the adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2, only the models with MCEnU and MCDon increased
their values in comparison with the models with only the control variables. This shows that in all
the cases, but the two mentioned, including MCs did not increase the explanatory capability of the
models. Thus, sustainability commitment (or non-commitment) measures of this type seem not to be
considered by credit rating agencies, though our opinion is that they should be.
3.2. Robustness Checks
To ensure the reliability of our previous results, this section presents four alternative robustness
checks: breaking down the sample into sub-periods, estimating the models by sector, using Fitch
ratings instead of S&P ratings as the dependent variable and using ASSET4 scores instead of the RSPM
as the sustainability performance measure. In all cases, we present the results of only some of the
estimations, but the remaining results are available from the authors upon request.
3.2.1. Sample Break-Down
First, we divided the sample into two and four periods of time. Remember that the dates go from
2009–2015 for RSPM and from 2010–2016 for MC.
Table 13 presents the results for RSPMcomb2, where, surprisingly, a decreasing pattern of the
influence of the RSPMs on S&P ratings is shown. It was in the earliest periods that the adjusted
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 increased the most with respect to the models without the RSPMs. Similar
findings were obtained for alternative RSPM measures, RSPMCO2 having the most persistent effect.
Table 13. Models with RSPMcomb2Lag1 for different time frames.
2009–2012 2013–2015 2009–2010 2011–2012 2013–2014 2015
RatingSP RSPMcomb2Lag1 0.152 0.071 0.235 0.093 0.076 0.060
(2.82) ** (1.57) (3.70) ** (1.49) (1.56) (1.11)
CAPINTLag1 0.922 0.573 1.184 0.729 0.470 0.745
(4.22) ** (2.96) ** (4.43) ** (3.13) ** (2.26) * (3.45) **
COVERAGELag1 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
(2.46) * (3.49) ** (1.20) (1.12) (2.84) ** (3.04) **
LEVERAGELag1 −2.501 −1.838 −2.800 −2.316 −1.945 −1.672
(6.69) ** (5.18) ** (6.32) ** (5.59) ** (5.00) ** (4.21) **
LOSSLag1 −0.924 −1.373 −1.169 −0.757 −1.417 −1.349
(4.77) ** (9.21) ** (4.24) ** (3.26) ** (7.89) ** (6.87) **
MARGINLag1 −0.008 −0.004 0.162 −0.007 −0.003 −0.005
(1.31) (2.49) * (0.57) (1.33) (2.19) * (2.54) *
SIZELag1 0.340 0.353 0.362 0.335 0.382 0.307
(11.01) ** (11.65) ** (9.76) ** (10.13) ** (11.91) ** (8.99) **
STDLag1 −1.877 −1.260 −2.402 −1.619 −1.377 −1.119
(8.25) ** (4.37) ** (7.84) ** (6.59) ** (5.07) ** (3.34) **
N 2183 2045 966 1217 1354 691
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1904 0.1949 0.2175 0.1676 0.2071 0.1626
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 of model without RSPM 0.1846 0.1939 0.2060 0.1659 0.2060 0.1627
This table shows the results of the fixed-effects ordered probit model estimation with the combination
of the environmental RSPMs and all the controls for different time frames. In all models, industry
and year effects are taken into account with industry and year dummies (not included in the table).
* and ** denote that the coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5% and 1%, respectively.
We also estimated the models for all of the MCs in different time frames, and the results were also
consistent: we found that no MC is significant in any time frame, as can be seen in Table 14 for the case
of MCcomb2.
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Table 14. Models with MCcomb2Lag2 for different time frames.
2010–2013 2014–2016 2010–2011 2012–2013 2014–2015 2016
RatingSP MCcomb2Lag2 −0.023 −0.056 0.126 −0.211 −0.163 0.199
(0.18) (0.35) (0.71) (0.98) (0.81) (0.81)
CAPINTLag1 0.762 0.526 0.864 0.616 0.534 0.545
(3.40) ** (2.81) ** (3.07) ** (2.72) ** (2.67) ** (2.78) **
COVERAGELag1 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.48) (3.29) ** (1.19) (2.09) * (3.78) ** (2.65) **
LEVERAGELag1 −2.673 −1.509 −2.819 −2.377 −1.696 −1.295
(6.82) ** (4.38) ** (5.37) ** (5.73) ** (4.48) ** (3.56) **
LOSSLag1 −1.096 −1.323 −0.917 −1.277 −1.393 −1.221
(6.80) ** (11.38) ** (3.78) ** (6.19) ** (9.16) ** (6.61) **
MARGINLag1 −0.003 0.002 0.172 −0.003 −0.003 0.008
(1.52) (0.70) (0.98) (2.08) * (1.44) (3.77) **
SIZELag1 0.333 0.326 0.316 0.357 0.342 0.299
(10.27) ** (10.53) ** (7.83) ** (10.58) ** (10.75) ** (8.83) **
STDLag1 −1.803 −1.832 −2.068 −1.670 −1.934 −1.700
(8.21) ** (8.06) ** (6.82) ** (7.99) ** (8.45) ** (6.21) **
N 1988 2009 846 1142 1329 680
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1852 0.1929 0.1725 0.1899 0.1976 0.1711
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 of model without MC 0.1856 0.1933 0.1732 0.1903 0.1979 0.1719
This table shows the results of the fixed-effects ordered probit model estimation with the MC of the
combination of the environmental RSPMs and all the controls for different time frames. In all models,
industry and year effects are taken into account with industry and year dummies (not included
in the table). * and ** denote that the coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5% and
1%, respectively.
3.2.2. By Sectors
To learn whether sustainability performance is more significant in some sectors than others,
we estimated the model by sectors and obtained some interesting results. Although not shown here,
we found that RSPMcomb1 had no effect in any sector, and that RSPMcomb2 was only taken into
account in the Basic Materialssector, which includes Chemicalsamong others. The results for RSPMDon
are also interesting: it was considered positive in the Energysector, but negative in Basic Materials,
Industrial Goods, Non-Cyclical Consumer Goodsand Utilities. Moreover, the results for Financialsshow
that none of the RSPMs had a significant effect on the credit ratings of companies in that sector.
Finally, we found that RSPMCO2 was one of the two (together with RSPMWasteT) that had the
most influence on ratings, possibly because of the visibility of CO2 emissions. We show these results
in Table 15. It can be seen that RSPMCO2 has a significantly positive coefficient in four out of the
10 sectors; surprisingly, Telecommunication Serviceswas one of them.
The adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2 was found to vary from sector to sector, being very high in
some, such as Healthcareand Telecommunication Services, and very low in others, such as the Cyclical
Consumer Goodsand Utilitysectors. Moreover, it can be seen that when the RSPMCO2 is included in
the models, the pseudo-R2 is greater than in the model without it in all cases except for the Financial
sector. It increases especially in the Utility, Telecommunication Services and Basic Materials sectors.
In the case of MC (not shown in the tables), almost all coefficients were found not to be significantly
different from zero, and there was hardly any difference from one sector to another. There were
three exceptions for different MCs in different sectors that we did not consider relevant. However,
in those cases, the sign of the coefficient was negative, which is the right direction.
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Table 15. Models by sector.







Financials Healthcare Technology Telecommunication
Services
Utilities
RatingSP RSPMCO2Lag1 0.317 0.341 0.239 0.182 0.236 −0.063 0.239 0.448 0.570 0.197
(2.43) * (4.39) ** (1.42) (1.18) (1.58) (1.48) (1.32) (2.44) * (3.00) ** (1.95)
CAPINTLag1 −0.179 −0.208 0.842 1.405 2.691 −0.300 5.751 1.305 2.263 1.107
(0.23) (0.33) (0.98) (1.34) (2.63) ** (1.04) (2.49) * (1.36) (2.24) * (1.76)
COVERAGELag1 0.007 −0.004 0.002 0.002 0.017 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.068
(2.10) * (0.59) (2.46) * (1.21) (1.75) (2.70) ** (2.15) * (0.80) (1.87) (1.48)
LEVERAGELag1 −2.053 −4.455 −7.149 −1.443 −3.503 0.374 −8.472 −1.463 −7.072 0.372
(1.43) (4.36) ** (5.61) ** (1.35) (2.80) ** (0.53) (3.44) ** (2.04) * (6.53) ** (0.38)
LOSSLag1 −2.708 −0.855 −1.673 −1.079 −0.883 −0.698 −1.553 0.263 −0.374
(3.91) ** (3.84) ** (4.48) ** (2.86) ** (2.19) * (2.51) * (4.29) ** (0.36) (1.01)
MARGINLag1 −0.416 −0.004 8.366 2.270 3.314 0.206 4.207 1.965 0.790 −0.637
(0.35) (1.57) (4.90) ** (1.14) (1.90) (1.35) (1.90) (1.58) (0.33) (0.59)
SIZELag1 0.493 0.441 0.531 0.372 0.352 0.329 1.741 0.599 0.442 0.299
(3.73) ** (3.91) ** (4.07) ** (3.66) ** (3.24) ** (6.82) ** (5.37) ** (5.39) ** (3.71) ** (3.09) **
STDLag1 −2.311 −1.128 −0.553 −0.532 −3.723 −3.029 −8.249 −1.554 −4.459 −3.369
(3.17) ** (3.87) ** (0.78) (2.14) * (4.38) ** (5.49) ** (4.09) ** (3.61) ** (3.23) ** (4.55) **
N 355 565 235 306 446 764 200 312 236 521
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.3424 0.1847 0.3162 0.0995 0.2189 0.1731 0.5387 0.2865 0.3480 0.1112
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 of model without MC 0.3331 0.1598 0.3153 0.0932 0.2082 0.1729 0.5381 0.2741 0.3087 0.1054
This table shows the results of the fixed-effects ordered probit model estimation with RSPMCO2 and all the controls for each sector. In all models, year effects are
taken into account with year dummies. * and ** denote that the coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5% and 1%, respectively.
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3.2.3. Fitch Ratings
To test whether the positive influence of the RSPM and lack of influence of the MC are also found
in ratings from other credit rating agencies, we estimated the main models presented above using
Fitch credit ratings instead of S&P ratings as the dependent variable. Surprisingly, we found that most
RSPMs did not have significant coefficients (only RSPMcomb2, RSPMEnU and RSPMWaterU did).
Since the number of observations was smaller for Fitch than for S&P ratings, we estimated the models
with the reduced sample of observations that had values for both ratings, and we found similar results.
We therefore concluded that this subsample showed less influence from sustainability performance
measures. Moreover, none of the MCs have significant coefficients, as occurred with the S&P ratings.
Table 16 presents the results for the combination of the environmental resources. As with the S&P
ratings’ models, RSPMcomb2 was significantly positive at a 5% level, while MCcomb2 was not. This is
also reflected in the adjusted McFadden’s pseudo-R2: for the RSPM model, it increased with respect to
the model with only the control variables, and for the MC model it decreased.





CAPINTLag1 0.682 0.906 0.644
(3.11) ** (3.38) ** (2.29) *
COVERAGELag1 −0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.44) (1.24) (3.15) **
LEVERAGELag1 −1.648 −2.013 −1.511
(4.38) ** (4.79) ** (3.60) **
LOSSLag1 −0.430 −0.450 −0.436
(3.02) ** (2.71) ** (2.73) **
MARGINLag1 1.433 1.457 1.804
(4.38) ** (3.83) ** (4.56) **
SIZELag1 0.448 0.433 0.448
(12.60) ** (11.45) ** (11.25) **
STDLag1 −1.255 −1.370 −1.499
(5.25) ** (4.71) ** (5.83) **
N 4052 3014 2803
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1910 0.2027 0.2038
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 of model without RSPM or MC 0.1910 0.2003 0.2040
This table shows the results of the fixed-effects ordered probit model estimation of one of the models
presented above with the rating by Fitch instead of S&P as the dependent variable. In all models,
industry and year effects are taken into account with industry and year dummies (not included in
the table). * and ** denote that the coefficients are significantly different from zero at 5% and 1%,
respectively.
3.2.4. ASSET4 Scores
Finally, we also wanted to know whether scores frequently used in the literature to assess
sustainability were considered when establishing the credit ratings of companies. To that end,
we included the sustainability performance measures by ASSET4 presented in the Data section.
Table 17 presents the results of our estimations. The coefficients of all three scores from ASSET4
were significantly positive, and they all improved on the model with only the control variables. We also
estimated the model with TotScoreA4 with the reduced sample using the observations that included
values for both TotScoreA4 and RSPMcomb2 (and also EnvScoreA4 and RSPMCO2). We found, on the
one hand, similar adjusted McFadden pseudo-R2 values and, on the other hand, less significance
for the RSPMs, showing that the more popular ASSET4 scores were taken into account more than
measures such as the RSPM when determining the credit ratings of companies.
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CAPINTLag1 0.572 0.645 0.513 0.713
(3.71) ** (2.45) * (1.88) (2.78) **
COVERAGELag1 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.37) (3.63) ** (3.80) ** (3.63) **
LEVERAGELag1 −1.971 −2.447 −2.169 −2.437
(6.91) ** (5.14) ** (4.39) ** (5.24) **
LOSSLag1 −1.201 −1.088 −1.081 −1.184
(12.17) ** (6.14) ** (5.86) ** (6.58) **
MARGINLag1 −0.001 1.203 1.209 1.180
(0.29) (2.58) ** (2.60) ** (2.65) **
SIZELag1 0.356 0.348 0.348 0.335
(13.79) ** (7.36) ** (7.37) ** (7.08) **
STDLag1 −1.445 −2.218 −2.449 −2.333
(8.94) ** (7.94) ** (7.80) ** (8.46) **
N 6006 2065 1922 2137
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 0.1814 0.2561 0.2515 0.2582
Adjusted McFadden’s Pseudo-R2 of model without ASSET4 Score 0.1814 0.2501 0.2444 0.2518
This table shows the results of the fixed-effects ordered probit model estimation with the different
scores from ASSET4 and all the controls. In all models, industry and year effects are taken into account
with industry and year dummies (not included in the table). * and ** denote that the coefficients are
significantly different from zero at 5% and 1%, respectively.
4. Discussion
This paper checks whether the novel sustainability performance and commitment measures
presented by [7] (namely, RSPM and MC) are taken into account in the real world, in the special case
of credit ratings. We conducted fixed-effects ordered probit model estimations with robust standard
errors clustered by company and included economic sector and year dummies.
We find that the one-year lag of RSPM is included in ratings by S&P in some cases, especially
RSPMCO2 and RSPMWaterU, showing that there are concerns about those issues. However,
the two-year lag of MC is not taken into account at all, which shows that the commitment of companies
to not worsen their performance is not given importance when credit ratings are awarded to them.
Analyzing the trend in this behavior over time, we find that the tendency to value good
sustainability performance by increasing the creditworthiness of companies decreased between 2009
and 2015, while the commitment of companies on those issues is not taken into account in any of the
periods analyzed.
Our sector by sector analysis shows that the RSPM included most in credit ratings is RSPMCO2,
which has a significantly positive effect on the credit ratings of companies in four out of 10 sectors,
including Energy and Basic Materials.
We also performed the analysis using Fitch ratings instead of S&P and found that for the
subsample with observations for both Fitch and S&P ratings, the RSPMs are not significant for either
rating. This is something that will have to be tested further to see if there are really differences between
the two ratings or not.
Finally, we confirmed the findings of other authors concerning the importance of more traditional
and popular scores such as those given by ASSET4 when determining credit ratings. It is, however,
worth mentioning that the calculation of those specific scores had been discontinued in 2018 and that a
new methodology to calculate ESG scores had been proposed by ASSET4 in 2017.
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All in all, we can conclude that traditional sustainability measures are taken into account by
credit rating agencies more than novel quantitative sustainability performance measures and that
commitment measures are not considered at all in the credit rating process.
We think that credit rating agencies should consider including both measures to a greater extent
in the rating process in order to better reflect the creditworthiness of the companies. Using them,
credit rating agencies would be able to select the most important ESG factors for each sector, not having
to rely on agglutinative scores.
The increasing sustainability consciousness of investors could provoke the above-mentioned
change in the rating process, and that way, the risks associated with irresponsible sustainability
behaviors would be penalized. Moreover, taking the sustainability performance and commitment
of companies into account when establishing credit ratings could foster improvements in corporate
governance [46], as well as environmental and social improvements. Interestingly, [63] stated that
companies that have lost their investment grade rating engage more in CSR afterwards. Similarly, [64]
find that companies ‘near a broad bond rating change tend to reduce their irresponsible CSR activities
more than firms that are not near a broad bond rating change’. This implies that if credit rating agencies
take into consideration sustainability performance and commitment measures such as RSPM and
MC when determining the ratings, they could encourage companies to behave more sustainably,
thus themselves also contributing to a more sustainable future.
This would also imply that firm managers would have to put sustainability in a more centered
position within the company’s strategy in order to pursue more non-financial objectives, for instance
reducing their CO2 emissions. This would benefit them because they would get better credit ratings
and be more sustainable, both economically, environmentally and socially. More importantly, society
as a whole would also benefit from their strategic switch.
With this paper, we have filled some gaps in the literature, such as the use of other sustainability
measures and not only global, but also individual measures, as suggested by [5]. However, the results
suffer from the limitation derived from the scarcity of non-financial reporting. Therefore, it would be
useful to repeat this study when more information about more resources is published by companies
and to customize the performance measures by including the resources most relevant to each sector
(or sub-sector if enough information is available).
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SD Sustainable Development
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
Sustainability 2018, 10, 4272 22 of 24
CO2 Carbon dioxide
CSP Corporate Social Performance
CFP Corporate Financial Performance
TFP Total Factor Productivity
ESG Environmental, Social and Governance
USD United States Dollars
EBIT Earnings Before Interest and Taxes
TA Total Assets
PPE Property, Plant and Equipment
References
1. WCED. Our Common Future (Brundtland Report); Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 1987.
2. UNDP. Sustainable Development Goals. 2016. Available online: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/
home/sustainable-development-goals.html (accessed on 8 May 2018).
3. UNESCO. Education for Sustainable Development. 2016. Available online: https://es.unesco.org/themes/
educacion-desarrollo-sostenible (accessed on 8 May 2018).
4. Hasan, I.; Kobeissi, N.; Liu, L.; Wang, H. Corporate social responsibility and firm financial performance:
The mediating role of productivity. J. Bus. Ethics 2018, 149, 671–688. [CrossRef]
5. Menz, K.M. Corporate social responsibility: Is it rewarded by the corporate bond market? A critical note.
J. Bus. Ethics 2010, 96, 117–134. [CrossRef]
6. Poveda, C.A.; Lipsett, M. A review of sustainability assessment and sustainability/environmental rating
systems and credit weighting tools. J. Sustain. Dev. 2011, 4, 36–55. [CrossRef]
7. Cubas-Díaz, M.; Martínez Sedano, M.Á. Measures for Sustainable Investment Decisions and Business
Strategy—A Triple Bottom Line Approach. Bus. Strategy Environ. 2018, 27, 16–38. [CrossRef]
8. Gloßner, S. The Price of Ignoring ESG Risks. 2018. Available online: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004689
(accessed on 29 June 2018).
9. Ameer, R.; Othman, R. Sustainability practices and corporate financial performance: A study based on the
top global corporations. J. Bus. Ethics 2012, 108, 61–79. [CrossRef]
10. Cai, Y.; Jo, H.; Pan, C. Doing well while doing bad? CSR in controversial industry sectors. J. Bus. Ethics 2012,
108, 467–480. [CrossRef]
11. Cheung, Y.L.; Jiang, K.; Mak, B.S.; Tan, W. Corporate social performance, firm valuation, and industrial
difference: Evidence from Hong Kong. J. Bus. Ethics 2013, 114, 625–631. [CrossRef]
12. Gregory, A.; Tharyan, R.; Whittaker, J. Corporate social responsibility and firm value: Disaggregating the
effects on cash flow, risk and growth. J. Bus. Ethics 2014, 124, 633–657. [CrossRef]
13. Jo, H.; Harjoto, M.A. Corporate governance and firm value: The impact of corporate social responsibility.
J. Bus. Ethics 2011, 103, 351–383. [CrossRef]
14. Li, F.; Li, T.; Minor, D. CEO power, corporate social responsibility, and firm value: A test of agency theory.
Int. J. Manag. Financ. 2016, 12, 611–628. [CrossRef]
15. Lourenço, I.C.; Branco, M.C.; Curto, J.D.; Eugénio, T. How does the market value corporate sustainability
performance? J. Bus. Ethics 2012, 108, 417–428. [CrossRef]
16. Rodgers, W.; Choy, H.L.; Guiral, A. Do investors value a firm’s commitment to social activities? J. Bus. Ethics
2013, 114, 607–623. [CrossRef]
17. Torugsa, N.A.; O’Donohue, W.; Hecker, R. Capabilities, proactive CSR and financial performance in SMEs:
Empirical evidence from an Australian manufacturing industry sector. J. Bus. Ethics 2012, 109, 483–500.
[CrossRef]
18. Waddock, S.A.; Graves, S.B. The corporate social performance–financial performance link. Strateg. Manag. J.
1997, 18, 303–319. [CrossRef]
19. Zanzana, S. The Empirical Link between Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Firm
Value. 2018. Available online: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3169651 (accessed on
16 July 2018).
20. Surroca, J.; Tribó, J.A.; Waddock, S. Corporate responsibility and financial performance: The role of intangible
resources. Strateg. Manag. J. 2010, 31, 463–490. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2018, 10, 4272 23 of 24
21. McWilliams, A.; Siegel, D. Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: Correlation or
misspecification? Strateg. Manag. J. 2000, 21, 603–609. [CrossRef]
22. Soana, M.G. The relationship between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance in
the banking sector. J. Bus. Ethics 2011, 104, 133–148. [CrossRef]
23. Baird, P.L.; Geylani, P.C.; Roberts, J.A. Corporate social and financial performance re-examined: Industry
effects in a linear mixed model analysis. J. Bus. Ethics 2012, 109, 367–388. [CrossRef]
24. Perrini, F.; Russo, A.; Tencati, A.; Vurro, C. Deconstructing the relationship between corporate social and
financial performance. J. Bus. Ethics 2011, 102, 59–76. [CrossRef]
25. Peng, C.W.; Yang, M.L. The effect of corporate social performance on financial performance: The moderating
effect of ownership concentration. J. Bus. Ethics 2014, 123, 171–182. [CrossRef]
26. Alshammari, M. Corporate social responsibility and firm performance: The moderating role of reputation
and institutional investors. Int. J. Bus. Manag. 2015, 10, 15–28. [CrossRef]
27. Li, Y.; Gong, M.; Zhang, X.Y.; Koh, L. The impact of environmental, social, and governance disclosure on
firm value: The role of CEO power. Br. Account. Rev. 2018, 50, 60–75. [CrossRef]
28. Pae, J.; Choi, T.H. Corporate governance, commitment to business ethics, and firm valuation: Evidence from
the Korean stock market. J. Bus. Ethics 2011, 100, 323–348. [CrossRef]
29. La Rosa, F.; Liberatore, G.; Mazzi, F.; Terzani, S. The impact of corporate social performance on the cost of
debt and access to debt financing for listed European non-financial firms. Eur. Manag. J. 2018, 36, 519–529.
[CrossRef]
30. El Ghoul, S.; Guedhami, O.; Kim, H.; Park, K. Corporate environmental responsibility and the cost of capital:
International evidence. J. Bus. Ethics 2018, 149, 335–361. [CrossRef]
31. Girerd-Potin, I.; Jimenez-Garcès, S.; Louvet, P. Which dimensions of social responsibility concern financial
investors? J. Bus. Ethics 2014, 121, 559–576. [CrossRef]
32. Breuer, W.; Müller, T.; Rosenbach, D.; Salzmann, A. Corporate Social Responsibility, Investor Protection,
and Cost of Equity: A Cross-Country Comparison. J. Bank. Financ. 2018, 96, 34–55. [CrossRef]
33. Ye, K.; Zhang, R. Do lenders value corporate social responsibility? Evidence from China. J. Bus. Ethics 2011,
104, 197–206. [CrossRef]
34. Sun, W.; Yao, S.; Govind, R. Reexamining Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Value: The Inverted-
U-Shaped Relationship and the Moderation of Marketing Capability. J. Bus. Ethics 2018, forthcoming.
[CrossRef]
35. Clacher, I.; Hagendorff, J. Do announcements about corporate social responsibility create or destroy
shareholder wealth? Evidence from the UK. J. Bus. Ethics 2012, 106, 253–266. [CrossRef]
36. Zeidan, M.J. Effects of illegal behavior on the financial performance of US banking institutions. J. Bus. Ethics
2013, 112, 313–324. [CrossRef]
37. Xu, X.; Zeng, S.; Tam, C.M. Stock market’s reaction to disclosure of environmental violations: Evidence from
China. J. Bus. Ethics 2012, 107, 227–237. [CrossRef]
38. Hsu, F.J.; Chen, Y.C. Is a firm’s financial risk associated with corporate social responsibility? Manag. Decis.
2015, 53, 2175–2199. [CrossRef]
39. Jo, H.; Na, H. Does CSR reduce firm risk? Evidence from controversial industry sectors. J. Bus. Ethics 2012,
110, 441–456. [CrossRef]
40. Mishra, S.; Modi, S.B. Positive and negative corporate social responsibility, financial leverage,
and idiosyncratic risk. J. Bus. Ethics 2013, 117, 431–448. [CrossRef]
41. Nguyen, P.; Nguyen, A. The effect of corporate social responsibility on firm risk. Soc. Responsib. J. 2015,
11, 324–339. [CrossRef]
42. Gupta, R.; Sharma, S. Non-Financial Determinants of Corporate Credit Ratings. Int. J. Eng. Technol. Sci. Res.
2017, 4, 412–415.
43. Birindelli, G.; Ferretti, P.; Intonti, M.; Iannuzzi, A.P. On the drivers of corporate social responsibility in banks:
Evidence from an ethical rating model. J. Manag. Gov. 2015, 19, 303–340. [CrossRef]
44. Zeidan, R.; Boechat, C.; Fleury, A. Developing a sustainability credit score system. J. Bus. Ethics 2015,
127, 283–296. [CrossRef]
45. Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services. Corporate Ratings Methodology; McGrawHill Financial: New York, NY,
USA, 2014.
Sustainability 2018, 10, 4272 24 of 24
46. Bereskin, F.L.; Kim, B.; Oh, F.D. Do credit rating concerns lead to better corporate governance? Evidence
from Korea. Pacif. Basin Financ. J. 2015, 35, 592–608. [CrossRef]
47. Scalet, S.; Kelly, T.F. The ethics of credit rating agencies: What happened and the way forward. J. Bus. Ethics
2012, 111, 477–490. [CrossRef]
48. Kirchschläger, P.G. Credit Rating Agencies aus einer ethischen Perspektive. In Ethik von Banken und Finanzen;
Stüttgen, M., Ed.; Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG: Baden-Baden, Germany, 2017.
49. Attig, N.; El Ghoul, S.; Guedhami, O.; Suh, J. Corporate social responsibility and credit ratings. J. Bus. Ethics
2013, 117, 679–694. [CrossRef]
50. Fitch Ratings, Inc. The Ratings Process; Fitch Ratings, Inc.: New York, NY, USA, 2016.
51. Ashbaugh-Skaife, H.; Collins, D.W.; LaFond, R. The effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings.
J. Account. Econ. 2006, 42, 203–243. [CrossRef]
52. Bhojraj, S.; Sengupta, P. Effect of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: The role of institutional
investors and outside directors. J. Bus. 2003, 76, 455–475. [CrossRef]
53. Chang, K.; Li, Y.; Shim, H. Does Trustworthiness Influence Creditworthiness?—A Global Study of Corporate
Social Responsibility Effect on Credit Rating. Presented at the 2017 FMA Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, USA,
11–14 October 2017.
54. Devalle, A.; Fiandrino, S.; Cantino, V. The Linkage between ESG Performance and Credit Ratings: A Firm-Level
Perspective Analysis. Int. J. Bus. Manag. 2017, 12, 53–65. [CrossRef]
55. Verzani, J. Using R for Introductory Statistics; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, USA, 2014.
56. Chambers, J.; Cleveland, W.; Kleiner, B.; Tukey, P. Graphical Methods for Data Analysis; Wadsworth
International Group & Duxbury Press: Belmont, CA, USA; Boston, MA, USA, 1983.
57. Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters Corporate Responsibility Ratings (TRCRR); Thomson Reuters Corporation:
New York, NY, USA, 2013.
58. Blume, M.E.; Lim, F.; MacKinlay, A.C. The declining credit quality of US corporate debt: Myth or reality?
J. Financ. 1998, 53, 1389–1413. [CrossRef]
59. Dang, C.; Li, Z.F.; Yang, C. Measuring firm size in empirical corporate finance. J. Bank. Financ. 2018,
86, 159–176. [CrossRef]
60. Li, F. Endogeneity in CEO power: A survey and experiment. Invest. Anal. J. 2016, 45, 149–162. [CrossRef]
61. McFadden, D. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In Frontiers in Econometrics;
Zarembka, P., Ed.; Academic Press: New York, NY, USA, 1974; Chapter 4.
62. McFadden, D. Quantitative Methods for Analyzing Travel Behaviour on Individuals: Some Recent
Developments. In Behavioural Travel Modelling; Hensher, D., Stopher, P., Eds.; Croom Helm London: London,
UK, 1978; Chapter 15.
63. Aktas, N.; Karampatsas, N.; Witkowski, A. Do Firms Adjust Their Corporate Social Responsibility
Engagement after a Substantial Change in Their Credit Rating? 2018. Available online: https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2886815 (accessed on 16 July 2018).
64. Chiang, W.C.; Shang, J.; Sun, L. Broad bond rating change and irresponsible corporate social responsibility
activities. Adv. Account. 2017, 39, 32–46. [CrossRef]
c© 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
